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Although debate on rules versus discretion in monetary policy-making has been 
lasting for a long time, the monetary authority in the world employs discretional 
policy in practice. Presently, the monetary authority employs discretion under the 
rules’ constraint, using rules constraint to stress monetary authority’s reputation, in 
order to promote the credibility and transparency of monetary policy to control 
inflation. 
This paper argues that discretionary policy can be divided into loose monetary 
policy implementation and the policy exit two alternating process. When monetary 
authority confront the occasions such as the Asian financial crisis or the subprime 
mortgage crisis shock, central bank implements loose monetary policy to stimulate the 
economy and increase employment, then exiting after the economy recovery. 
However, throughout the history of discretionary policy in various countries, 
monetary authority implements loose monetary more active comparing to policy exit 
period, leading to the asymmetry in practice. There are linkage between the Fed’s last 
loose monetary exit and housing bubble during 2002-2005 years. Comparing to target 
rules, Taylor rule and McCallum rule of the instrument rule are tighter. As a result, it 
can improve the effect of monetary policy-making during loose monetary policy exit. 
Taylor studied the subprime mortgage crisis and McCallum studied Japanese 
economy bubble period, empirical test proof that instrument rule could help monetary 
authority to search the best policy exit time. 
Through empirical test, Taylor rule is not ideal, the Granger-causality test 
showed that policy operations focus on output gap, lacking of concern about inflation. 
Monetary policy mainly depended on the quantity policy instrument, not on the 
interest policy instrument. As a result, the feedback between interest rate and inflation 
or output gap was not obvious. Under the McCallum rule, monetary policy was 
pro-cyclical in China, money supply growth changing with output gap in the same 
direction, leading monetary policy operation to failure. What’s more, there was a 
structural break of 2007 in the model. Foreign exchange problem and currency 
endogenous factor may cause it. Therefore, monetary policy should gradually change 
from quantity monetary control to rate regulation. 
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研究。麦卡勒姆（2003）[12]对日本 1991 年-2001 年的货币政策进行检验，分析
麦卡勒姆规则与泰勒规则对日本货币政策的解释能力，发现泰勒规则对于日本的
解释效果并不理想，而麦卡勒姆规则表现更优秀。泰勒（2007[13]，2009[14]）利
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